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INTRODUCTION 
Genetically modified (GM) plants—also known as genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), transgenic crops, or the product of 
recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology—were introduced in the commercial 
marketplace in 1996.1 Since then, the global surface area planted in such 
crops has been increasing annually at a growth rate of more than ten 
percent.2 Twenty-five countries planted GM crops in 2008, a significant 
increase from the six countries that started out in 1996.3 This rapid growth 
shows no sign of slowing down.4 The total accumulated global area covered 
by biotechnology (biotech) crops between 1996 and 2008 has now 
surpassed two billion acres, and while it took ten years to reach the first 
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 1. Yong Gao, Biosafety Issues, Assessment, and Regulation of Genetically Modified Food 
Plants, in THE GMO HANDBOOK 297, 298 (Sarad R. Parekh ed., 2004). 
 2. Id. 
 3. International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, ISAAA Brief 39-
2008 Executive Summary, 
http://www.isaaa.org/Resources/Publications/briefs/39/executivesummary/default.html (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2011). 
 4. See id. (providing compiled statistics on the growth of commercial biotechnology crops 
and farmers around the world from 1996 to 2008). 
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billion acre milestone,5 it took only three years to hit the second billion.6 
Amidst this global surge, the U.S. is by far the leading grower of GM 
crops.7 Herbicide-tolerant soybean and insect-resistant corn are two of the 
most common GM crops in the U.S.8 These products are now ubiquitous in 
the American food supply: as much as eighty-five percent of corn and 
ninety-one percent of soybeans in this country may be genetically 
engineered (GE).9 Up to seventy percent of processed foods found in the 
grocery store contain such ingredients.10 Because the existing regulatory 
framework does not require manufacturers to disclose these components on 
their labels,11 these foods are making their way to the American dinner 
table without the knowledge of consumers. Though GM products have been 
available for thirteen years, and though they fall under the purview of three 
different federal agencies (the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA)),12 the policy debate surrounding appropriate 
regulatory measures is ongoing.13  
A. Defining GMOs and the Stakeholders 
Biotechnology has been defined as the application of ―scientific 
principles to living organisms and their components to produce new 
inventions or processes.‖14 More specifically, GM crops result from the use 
of rDNA technology enabling the insertion of genes from one species into 
another in order to produce desirable traits, such as pesticide resistance.15 
These combinations could not occur under traditional breeding 
procedures.16 Due to the genetic engineering process, it is thought that GM 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Gao, supra note 1, at 298. 
 9. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, GE FOOD, http://truefoodnow.org/campaigns/genetically-
engineered-foods/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2011). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See infra, Part I.B.1.  
 12. See infra, Part I.A.1. 
 13. Matthew Rich, The Debate Over Genetically Modified Crops in the United States: 
Reassessment of Notions of Harm, Difference, and Choice, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 889, 889 
(2004). 
 14. W. Christopher Matton & F. Scott Thomas, The Continuing Balance: Federal Regulation 
of Biotechnology, 44 JURIMETRICS 283, 284 (2004). 
 15. Doug Farquhar & Liz Meyer, State Authority to Regulate Biotechnology Under the 
Federal Coordinated Framework, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 439, 441 (2007). 
 16. Id. 
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foods could pose unique health, environmental, agricultural,17 and 
economic consequences.18 Thus, the stakeholders in this debate tend to be 
consumer advocacy groups, health-related entities, and environmental and 
organic farming organizations on the one hand, versus the powerful 
biotechnology industry and government regulators on the other.19 This 
Comment will focus primarily on the human health perspective rather than 
environmental and agricultural risks.20 Cloned meat sources and other 
forms of GM crops, such as those developed for pharmaceutical purposes, 
are beyond the scope of this analysis. 
B. Biotechnology Policy Principles: Regulating out Vs. Regulating in 
An overarching theme throughout any discussion of biotechnology is 
whether it is more appropriate to assume that a new development is safe or 
unsafe until proven otherwise. The approach of the European Union (EU) 
has been consistent with the latter21 and in general, the Precautionary 
Principle.22 This concept holds that government has a duty to intervene or 
regulate where there is even a possibility of harm to the public health or the 
environment.23 The United States takes the opposite perspective, that 
―GMOs should be permitted to flourish in the absence of proven hazards.‖24 
 
 17. See generally Rich, supra note 13, at 895–900 (describing the effects of GMO use on the 
environment and agriculture, such as a potential decrease in biodiversity). 
 18. See Jim Chen, Lecture, Beyond Food and Evil, 56 DUKE L.J. 1581, 1582 (2007) (noting 
the risk that economic pressure to produce GMOs could put farmers who are already under 
financial strain out of business). 
 19. See, e.g., Michael Jacobson, Opinion-Editorial, The Genetically Modified Food Fight, 172 
W. J. MED. 220, 220 (2000) (arguing on behalf of the Center for Science in the Public Interest that 
additional testing and regulation of GMOs is needed). See also Gregory N. Mandel, Technology 
Wars: The Failure of Democratic Discourse, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 117, 134 
(2005) (pointing out that in the debate over biotechnology, ―polarization and deadlock lead each 
group to focus on opposition and preventing the other side from achieving its goals, rather than 
searching for and pursuing mutually beneficial outcomes‖ and noting that mutually beneficial 
solutions tend to ―receive minimal attention from interest groups, the media, and the public‖).  
 20. See infra, Part II. 
 21. Thomas J. Moyer & Stephen P. Anway, Biotechnology and the Bar: A Response to the 
Growing Divide Between Science and the Legal Environment, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 671, 695 
(2007).  
 22. Rich, supra note 13, at 901.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Moyer & Anway, supra note 21, at 695. At the same time, some scholars believe it is an 
oversimplification to state that the EU follows the precautionary principle, while the U.S. rejects 
it. See, e.g., John D. Graham, The Perils of the Precautionary Principle: Lessons from the 
American and European Experience, HERITAGE LECTURES (Jan. 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/The-Perils-of-the-Precautionary-Principle-Lessons-
from-the-American-and-European-Experience (arguing that it is a ―fallacy‖ to categorize the EU 
as precautionary and the U.S. as the opposite because there is no unified concept behind the 
―precautionary principle‖ and both countries utilize precautionary stances toward regulation in 
different ways).  
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The precautionary principle derives originally from German environmental 
policy in the 1970‘s, and has since come to inform many international 
treaties and protocols, such as the United Nations Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety.25 The Protocol authorized member states to apply the 
precautionary principle by regulating or banning GMOs where there is 
scientific uncertainty about their risks.26 The EU has viewed GMOs with an 
inherent distrust, imposing a strict regulatory scheme beginning in 1998,27 
which effectively banned products containing GMOs by refusing to approve 
them for sale.28 The resulting moratorium on the import of American 
agricultural products created with genetic engineering, particularly corn, has 
been a source of dispute between the U.S. and the EU ever since and has 
cost the U.S. at least three hundred million dollars according to some 
estimates.29 In 2003, the U.S., Argentina, and Canada filed a complaint 
against the EU with the World Trade Organization (WTO), arguing that the 
de facto ban violated international trade rules.30 The EU ended the 
moratorium to some extent the following year by approving an American 
variety of GE corn, but only after member states were unable to reach a 
decision for or against approval.31 In May 2006, the WTO issued a final 
ruling that found the EU ban to be in violation of several trade 
 
 25. Michael Pollan, The Year in Ideas: A to Z; Precautionary Principle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 
2001, at 92. 
 26. Debra M. Strauss, Feast or Famine: The Impact of the WTO Decision Favoring the U.S. 
Biotechnology Industry in the EU Ban of Genetically Modified Foods, 45 AMER. BUS. L.J. 775, 
815 (2008). The Director of the Trade and Agriculture Project at the Institute for Agriculture and 
Trade Policy has described the impact of the Cartagena Protocol as follows:  
There is already a broad international consensus on how to handle GE crops 
at the international level established at the Cartagena Protocol. This 
consensus acknowledges that each country has the right to regulate GE crops 
based on precautionary principles, to require labeling of GE crops, and to 
protect farmers and others from unfair liability arising from the release of GE 
crops into the environment and food distribution system. 
Press Release, Inst. for Agric. & Trade Policy, WTO Ruling on Genetically Engineered Crops 
Would Override International, National, and Local Protections (Feb. 7, 2006), 
http://www.iatp.org/iatp/library/admin/uploadedfiles/WTO_Ruling_on_Genetically_Engineered_
Crops_Wou.pdf. 
 27. Strauss, supra note 26, at 780 (―U.S. consumers appear to be less aware of the potential 
risks and more trusting of their regulatory agencies; Europeans are more risk averse to the human 
health and safety issues associated with GM food products.‖).  
 28. Justin Gillis & Paul Blustein, WTO Ruling Backs Biotech Crops; European Ban, 
Challenged by U.S. and Allies, Violates Trade Regulations, Panel Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 
2006, at D01 (noting that the ban occurred from 1998 until 2004). 
 29. Strauss, supra note 26, at 781–82 (citing RAYMOND J. AHEARN, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, TRADE CONFLICT AND THE U.S.-EUROPEAN UNION ECONOMIC 
RELATIONSHIP 19 (2007), available at 
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL30732.pdf). 
 30. Id. at 775. 
 31. Id. at 808. 
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regulations.32 How to correctly interpret this complex decision has been a 
source of ongoing controversy since then, and its impact remains unclear.33 
Biotechnology companies would like the world to view the ruling as ―an 
unequivocal endorsement of GM foods,‖34 while others note the continued 
resistance among European consumers35 and the fact that few GM products 
have actually been approved by the EU since the moratorium was lifted in 
2004.36  
Amidst this international landscape of uncertainty, it becomes more 
urgent to ask whether the U.S. is taking the appropriate approach to 
regulating GMOs within its borders. This Comment will explore the risks 
that flow from rejecting the Precautionary Principle, beginning with an 
examination of the existing regulatory framework for GMO labeling within 
the U.S. and the rationale for current FDA policy.37 Not only are the long-
term health risks of GMOs unknown,38 but there are many known, potential 
consequences associated with their integration into the food supply, such as 
increased allergenicity,39 toxicity,40 and antibiotic resistance.41 The debate 
surrounding labeling of GMOs has often resulted in polarized arguments, 
with GMO proponents arguing against a labeling requirement on one end, 
and GMO opponents arguing for a total ban on the other.42 The 
implementation of a mandatory labeling requirement is a moderate solution 
to bridge this gap; without banning GMOs altogether, such a requirement 
would at least enable consumer awareness and choice and encourage the 
pursuit of additional research.43 After addressing the legal insufficiency of a 
 
 32. Id. at 776. 
 33. For a detailed discussion of the ruling, see id. at 785-806. 
 34. Id. at 806-07. 
 35. Id. at 807. 
 36. Foreign Agricultural Service: U.S. Mission to the European Union, Biotechnology, 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/posthome/useu/GMOs.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). According to the 
Foreign Agricultural Service U.S. Mission to the European Union, just nine products resulting 
from biotechnology have been approved for marketing in the EU since May 2004. Id. See also 
Strauss, supra note 26, at 808 (noting that of the more than forty-seven biotechnology products 
awaiting EU approval since the lifting of the moratorium, several have been delayed in the review 
process for over six years, in stark contrast to the typical six to nine month process in the U.S., 
Canada, and Japan). 
 37. See infra, Part I.A.1.  
 38. See infra, Part II.A.4.  
 39. See infra, Part II.A.1.  
 40. See infra, Part II.A.2. 
 41. See infra, Part II.A.3.  
 42. Press Release, GE Labeling Debate Continues in the U.S., Jun. 27, 2002, 
http://www.organicconsumers.org/gefood/uslabels070302.cfm. 
 43. See infra, Part II.B.  
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state law solution, this Comment concludes that a labeling requirement 
should fall under federal law.44 
I. THE ROLE OF LAW FROM FIELD TO TABLE 
A. Introduction to Existing Regulatory Structure 
1. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology  
In 1986, the White House created a committee within the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to explore options for regulating 
GMOs, then in their infancy.45 The resulting publication, the Coordinated 
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology (Coordinated Framework),46 
announced several opinions and decisions that would become foundational 
principles, informing federal policy over the next several years.47 Most 
important was the decision to utilize existing federal oversight agencies and 
legal authorities rather than creating new ones for the specific purpose of 
regulating GMOs.48 The Coordinated Framework took the approach that the 
products of biotechnology should be regulated rather than the process 
itself.49 It also laid the groundwork for the relationship between the USDA, 
EPA, and FDA.50 USDA was tasked to focus on the potential threat to 
existing agriculture, EPA on the environmental consequences of pesticides, 
and FDA on the human health impacts.51 Using existing agencies for 
oversight had the advantage of cost efficiency while also avoiding ―dilution 
of relevant expertise and resources caused by the redistribution of those 
resources across different departments.‖52 The disadvantages of using older 
laws, which were written before the wide-ranging implications of newly 
emerging biotechnology techniques could be anticipated,53 are explored in 
the remainder of this Comment. As critics of the Coordinated Framework 
 
 44. See infra, Part II.C.  
 45. Alan McHughen & Stuart Smyth, US Regulatory System for Genetically Modified 
[Genetically Modified Organism (GMO), rDNA or transgenic] Crop Cultivars, 6 PLANT 
BIOTECH. J. 2, 4 (2007).  
 46. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (Jun. 26, 
1986). 
 47. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 441–42. 
 48. Lauren Zeichner, Product vs. Process: Two Labeling Regimes for Genetically Engineered 
Foods and How They Relate to Consumer Preference, 27 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y J. 467, 
477 (2004).  
 49. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302–303 (Jun. 
26, 1986). 
 50. Id. at 23,303. 
 51. McHughen & Smyth, supra note 45, at 4. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 457.  
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have expressed, ―Congress wrote many of the laws used to govern 
biotechnology before scientists even knew that rDNA modifications were 
possible, and the laws are not keeping pace with new technological 
developments.‖54 
2. USDA and EPA Authority 
The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of USDA 
regulates GM plants under authority granted by the Plant Protection Act of 
2000.55 Its primary concern is the protection of agriculture from pests.56 
According to a 2008 article, USDA has authorized over twelve thousand 
field trials since the relevant regulation was first published in 1987.57 The 
majority of common GM plants are approved for field trials, import, or 
transportation between states under a simple notification procedure.58 This 
process requires a letter to the agency demonstrating that the plant meets 
particular threshold standards,59 such as not originating from a noxious 
weed species.60 For proposed plants that do not meet such standards, there 
is a permit process involving heightened scrutiny.61 In 1993, the USDA 
implemented new regulations enabling GM plant producers to seek non-
regulated status for certain plants considered safe based on prior review by 
the agency.62 Obtaining non-regulated status involves an assessment of 
potential environmental impacts of releasing the proposed plant and 
additional requirements63 in order to comply with the Plant Protection Act64 
and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).65 
The EPA, on the other hand, regulates proposed GM plants under 
authority of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA), first enacted in 1947.66 According to the agency, it regulates 
pesticidal characteristics rather than the plants themselves.67 As a result, 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C §§ 7701–7786 (2006 & Supp. 2009).  
 56. McHughen & Smyth, supra note 45, at 4–5. 
 57. Id. at 5. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 5–6 (describing the permitting process, which involves higher scrutiny than the 
notification process and applies to genetically modified plants that don‘t meet the requirements for 
notification). 
 62. Id. at 6. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7786 (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
 65. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2006).  
 66. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2006). 
 67. McHughen & Smyth, supra note 45, at 9. 
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proposed GM plants with pesticide or virus resistance (regardless of the 
mechanism creating the resistance) have fallen under EPA review since 
1995, when the agency started enforcing its initial regulations.68 In 2001, 
the EPA began exempting certain categories of GM plants from its 
oversight.69 EPA approval involves review of specified data ranging from 
product characterization to toxicity in non-target species and soil, and 
assessment of risks associated with gene escape.70 
B. Regulating for Human Health and Safety: The Role of the FDA 
1. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
The FDA is primarily responsible for regulating the safety of food 
products in the American marketplace.71 Under the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA),72 which was initially passed in 1938, the agency has 
authority to take legal action against producers of adulterated or misbranded 
foods or impose labeling requirements.73 Adulterated food contains ―any 
poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to 
health.‖74 Misbranding, on the other hand, means advertising or labeling 
that it is false or misleading.75 A misleading label fails to reveal facts that 
are ―material‖ with respect to the representations made on the label or the 
consequences that may result from using the product.76 Whether or not 
genetic modification is a material fact under this rubric is the critical 
inquiry.77 The FDA provided its response to this question in a pivotal 1992 
 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. at 9–11 (explaining the various categories of data required for submission as part 
of the approval process and the concerns the EPA seeks to address by analyzing each type of 
data).  
 71. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 450; Zeichner, supra note 48, at 480. 
 72. Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 24 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006 & Supp. 2009).  
 73. Zeichner, supra note 48, at 480–81. See also CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED 
NUTRITION, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: VOLUNTARY LABELING 
INDICATING WHETHER FOODS HAVE OR HAVE NOT BEEN DEVELOPED USING BIOENGINEERING 
(draft) (2001), 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/Food
LabelingNutrition/ucm059098.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2011) (explaining that the FDA has 
authority to impose labeling requirements under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act when the label 
for an existing food product fails to provide certain ―material‖ information and describing 
situations where specific labeling has typically been required, such as when the absence of the 
information could pose a particular health risk). 
 74. 21 U.S.C. § 342 (a)(1) (2006).  
 75. Id. § 343(a)(1). 
 76. Id. § 321(n). 
 77. Emily Robertson, Note, Finding a Compromise in the Debate Over Genetically Modified 
Food: An Introduction to a Model State Consumer Right-to-Know Act, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
156, 159 (2003). 
JESADA - Vol 13 Website Final 4/28/2011 7:12 PM 
S-38 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 14:Supp. 
policy statement, which announced that the agency did not consider the 
process to be material.78 Rather, the FDA would regulate bioengineered 
foods based on the end product, a policy consistent with the Coordinated 
Framework‘s approach.79 The statement also clarified that labeling of GM 
ingredients would not be required because they are considered ―generally 
regarded as safe‖ (GRAS) and laid the groundwork for evaluating the safety 
of proposed GM foods under the FDCA.80  
Under these standards, adulterated foods, meaning ―foods containing 
unexpected or novel substances, or usual substances falling outside normal 
ranges for that kind of food,‖81 trigger FDA review, while unadulterated 
foods do not, regardless of the process used to create them.82 GM foods that 
have an identical or nearly identical composition as their traditional 
counterparts (meaning ―composed of the same substances and in the same 
amounts and relative proportions‖83) are considered unadulterated and 
therefore do not require regulatory review.84 This criteria set is also known 
as the substantial equivalence doctrine.85 Because most GM food products 
qualify as unadulterated,86 they are subject to no more than the same 
labeling requirements imposed on regular foods.87 Only when a proposed 
GM product contains an additive that is neither GRAS nor a known allergen 
will additional scrutiny— and labeling of the allergen under the FDCA or a 
change of the product name to reflect its actual substance— be required.88  
2. Voluntary FDA Consultation 
Though there is no mandatory assessment process for unadulterated 
foods, the FDA does offer consultations to evaluate the safety of new 
 
 78. Zeichner, supra note 48, at 482. 
 79. See infra, Part II.A.1. 
 80. Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,990–991 (May 29, 
1992). 
 81. McHughen & Smyth, supra note 45, at 7. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. See also Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 450 (―In this context, ‗equivalent‘ 
means that there is no meaningful change in nutritional value or composition of the good and that 
the new variety is as safe as the existing varieties already in commerce.‖). 
 85. Zeichner, supra note 48, at 481–82. 
 86. Id. at 482. 
 87. Robertson, supra note 77, at 160; Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 452 (―If the 
nutritional content or potential allergens are the same, FDA will not require a label.‖). 
 88. See Robertson, supra note 77, at 160 (explaining the four limited circumstances under 
which GMO labeling could be required according to current FDA policy); Farquhar & Meyer, 
supra note 15, at 451 (noting that pre-market FDA approval is required for new genetically 
modified plant varieties if the new product contains a food additive that has not been deemed 
GRAS or if the plant ―contains a known allergen that it previously did not contain‖). 
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foods.89 Unlike the reviews required by the USDA and EPA, this process is 
informal and voluntary.90 It involves submission of data by the developer of 
the proposed product to the FDA, which evaluates the product‘s nutritional 
composition in comparison to its non-GM counterpart and whether it 
contains any new toxins or allergens.91 In 1997, the FDA provided 
procedural guidelines for compiling the relevant data.92 At the end of the 
consultation, the agency does not approve or reject the product based on its 
evaluation; instead, it develops a memo describing the product and 
potentially relevant safety considerations.93 Some articles suggest that all 
GM food products currently available to the public have been submitted for 
such a consultation.94 There is no reliable way of verifying whether such 
claims are accurate, however, because the consultation process is voluntary. 
As a result, the FDA only has information on the products for which 
manufacturers sought consultation, but there may be countless other 
products on the market containing GMOs. Moreover, even if all products 
have been subjected to consultation, the process does not impose stringent 
requirements, nor does it prove that a new product is safe.95 In actuality, the 
FDA memo represents nothing more than a conclusion that the product is 
―as safe as its non-modified counterparts,‖ and this conclusion is based only 
on the evidence reviewed, which is provided by the developer.96 It is also 
noteworthy that under these voluntary consultation procedures, the FDA 
has never rejected a proposed product or refused to allow its development.97 
3. Case Law Upholding FDA Policy 
The FDA‘s rejection of mandatory labeling for GMOs was upheld by a 
federal district court in 2000.98 In Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala,99 a 
 
 89. McHughen & Smyth, supra note 45, at 8. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. 
 92. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Consultation Procedures Under FDA‘s 1992 Statement of 
Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/Biote
chnology/ucm096126.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2011). 
 93. McHughen & Smyth, supra note 45, at 9. 
 94. See, e.g., Jacobson, supra note 19, at 220 (noting in 2000 that all companies marketing 
new GM foods had undergone voluntary consultation with the FDA). 
 95. McHughen and Smyth, supra note 45, at 9. 
 96. Id. (―It is worth noting that the FDA does not formally ‗approve‘ an application, or even 
pass judgment on the safety or efficacy of the new product. Instead, the FDA issues a ‗memo‘ 
summarizing the features and how they may affect safety concerns. . . . The FDA does not 
conclude that: ‗This new food/feed is safe.‘ Instead, it concludes, based on the evidence reviewed, 
that: ‗This new food/feed is as safe as its non-modified counterparts.‘‖). 
 97. Rich, supra note 13, at 902 (noting in 2004 that the FDA had not refused to permit 
development of a single GM product in the last ten years). 
 98. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 179 (D.D.C. 2000).  
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group of consumer advocacy and public interest organizations, along with 
religious leaders, researchers, and other individuals, challenged the FDA‘s 
policy of presuming GM food products to be GRAS under the FDCA.100 
Legal grounds for their claims ranged from violation of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (the 1992 policy statement did not undergo notice-and-
comment)101 to violation of the First Amendment (based on the 
impossibility of avoiding certain food products, if unlabeled, due to 
religious objections)102 and a claim that the GRAS presumption was 
arbitrary and capricious.103 The plaintiffs argued that the FDA had a duty to 
consider consumer interest in labeling based on the FDCA and the special 
requirements of people with allergies and religious limitations.104 The 
Court found, however, that the FDA‘s scientific and technological expertise 
was entitled to deference,105 in particular the agency‘s conclusion that 
genetic engineering as a process does not constitute a material change to 
food products.106 As the Court summarized,  
Plaintiffs . . . fail to recognize that the determination that a 
product differs materially from the type of product it 
purports to be is a factual predicate to the requirement of 
labeling. Only once materiality has been established may 
the FDA consider consumer opinion to determine whether a 
label is required to disclose a material fact.107 
The Court also rejected the plaintiffs‘ constitutional and administrative law 
arguments and ultimately awarded summary judgment to the FDA.108 
The Alliance Court‘s holding has been interpreted as establishing that 
the FDA‘s authority to mandate labeling of GM foods under current law is 
extremely limited.109 Whether the Court‘s legal analysis is correct is a 
matter of debate, and there are no other cases directly addressing the 
 
 99. Id. at 166.  
 100. Id. at 170. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 178. 
 105. Id. at 179 (―The FDA has already determined that, in general, rDNA modification does 
not ‗materially‘ alter foods, and . . . this determination is entitled to deference.‖). 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 181. 
 109. Zeichner, supra note 48, at 483. See also Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. 
Regulatory Policy on Genetically Modified Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 756 
(2003) (―Ultimately, this decision made clear that critics of FDA's policy had very little legal 
ground on which to stand. The case, however, did heighten public awareness of GM foods and 
added to the perception that the government was not regulating these products.‖). 
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issue.110 If this narrow interpretation of the FDA‘s statutory authority is 
appropriate, then the only circumstances under which the agency could 
properly require GMO labeling would be in the face of a known health or 
safety risk.111 Yet there are many potential, unknown health risks posed by 
GMOs that concern consumers and remain entirely unaddressed by the 
FDA‘s policy of regulating the product only.112 Section II of this Comment 
argues that such risks constitute sufficient justification for a labeling 
requirement.113 In order to reach this end in light of the Alliance Court‘s 
analysis and the FDA‘s current position, new federal statutory authority will 
be necessary (or, in the absence of an overhaul to existing FDA policies like 
substantial equivalence, amendments to the FDCA to create a pre-market 
approval requirement that captures GM foods deemed ―unadulterated‖ are 
needed). 
II. MANDATORY LABELING OF FOOD PRODUCTS CONTAINING GMOS 
SHOULD BE REQUIRED UNDER FEDERAL LAW 
A. Mandatory Labeling Would Enable Consumers to Make Informed 
Decisions in Light of the Known and Unknown Health Risks Associated 
with GMOs 
1. Allergens 
One of the most serious health concerns associated with GMOs is the 
possibility of introducing a food allergen that consumers would be unable to 
anticipate in a particular product.114 There are multiple ways in which 
rDNA technology creates this possibility, because it enables scientists to 
transfer genes between unrelated plants115 and even kingdoms (e.g., the 
 
 110. See Moyer & Anway, supra note 21, at 701 (―Alliance for Bio-Integrity remains one of 
the few reported judicial opinions to directly address the growing safety concerns associated with 
GMOs.‖). 
 111. Zeichner, supra note 48, at 483. 
 112. Id. at 487 (―Consumers are concerned that the process of genetic engineering may create 
unknown product characteristics that could pose risks in the long-term….Therefore consumer 
concerns are not completely addressed in the case of GE foods, by informing them solely of 
product-based risks.‖); Rich, supra note 13, at 904 (―Until new legislation aimed directly at the 
regulation of genetically modified products is put into place, the FDA‘s choices are determining 
the government‘s approach to the new technology, and may not reflect the concerns of the people 
as represented by their legislators.‖). 
 113. See infra, Part II.B.  
 114. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706, 4709 (Jan. 18, 
2001); Jacobson, supra note 19, at 220; McHughen & Smyth, supra note 45, at 8; Gao, supra note 
1, at 304. 
 115. See Gao, supra note 1, at 297. 
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insertion of an animal gene into a plant).116 First, the direct expression of 
transferred allergenic proteins may occur, in which case the source of the 
inserted gene is determinative of allergenicity.117 Because genetic 
engineering increases the variety of proteins that can be used beyond those 
available with traditional breeding, it increases the possibility of inserting a 
protein that is an allergen.118 Second, the transfer could cause an indirect 
effect by activating or de-activating genes adjacent to the insertion site and 
thereby altering the existing allergenic proteins in the host plant.119 
Notably, this kind of effect is also possible under traditional breeding 
techniques.120 Third, because rDNA technology enables the expression of 
proteins at higher concentrations than would normally be possible, ―these 
higher concentrations may increase the potential for such proteins to be 
allergenic.‖121 
Under any of these mechanisms, known allergens do not pose a 
significant threat because they can be identified, and they must be labeled 
under the FDCA.122 It is the possibility of introducing an unknown allergen 
(i.e., a protein that has not previously been identified as a common allergen) 
that presents a serious health risk under a regulatory scheme that fails to 
require testing for allergenic properties or labeling of GM ingredients, 
which would at least alert consumers to the possibility of an unidentified 
allergen‘s presence.123 As one author has stated, ―successful testing 
ordinarily requires human volunteers, which is expensive. Although the 
likelihood that any particular protein in a genetically modified food is an 
allergen is relatively small, it is also unlikely that such an allergy would be 
discovered without extensive testing.‖124 In a 2001 policy statement, the 
FDA commented that it would most likely consider food containing an 
unexpected allergen to be adulterated, and therefore the agency ―should be 
made aware of the modification and have an opportunity to assess whether 
 
 116. Margaret Gilhooley, Reexamining the Labeling for Biotechnology in Foods: The Species 
Connection, 82 NEB. L. REV. 1088, 1111 (2004). 
 117. Gao, supra note 1, at 304. 
 118. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4709. 
 119. Gao, supra note 1, at 304 (―As a result of transformation, neighboring genes at the site of 
integration of the insert DNA may be turned off or turned on, resulting in changes in existing 
proteins. Consequently, the possibility exists that the content of existing allergens of the plant 
could be elevated or reduced.‖). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4709. 
 122. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(w) (2006) (describing food labeling requirements for known 
allergens). 
 123. Rich, supra note 13, at 894; see also Jacobson, supra note 19, at 220 (―An allergen newly 
introduced into the food supply (say, from a bacterium) would be difficult to identify.‖). 
 124. Rich, supra note 13, at 894. 
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and how the food could legally be marketed.‖125 The statement was part of 
a proposed notice requirement, however, and the FDA never issued a final 
ruling.126 
 One example of the allergy risks associated with genetic engineering 
occurred when a U.S. company developed a nutritionally enhanced soybean 
containing a protein from the Brazil nut.127 Scientists were aware that the 
Brazil nut was allergenic to some individuals, but did not know which 
specific protein caused the allergy.128 Initial research involving human 
testing determined that the GM soybean expressed the allergenic protein; 
therefore, the product was destroyed and never reached the commercial 
marketplace.129 Though in this case, the allergen was caught prior to 
causing any detrimental or potentially fatal consequences,130 the situation 
serves as an example that the introduction of new allergens into the food 
supply is more than a theoretical possibility. Had the producer of the 
proposed product not discovered the problem, it would have been left to the 
company‘s discretion whether or not to seek review by the FDA.131 
Without a mandatory review and labeling requirement, there remains a 
strong possibility that unknown allergens will be introduced into the food 
supply in the future. 
2. Toxins 
Genetic engineering also presents a risk of creating new toxins or 
altering levels of existing ones.132 As with allergens, the effect may be 
direct or indirect.133 A common example of the direct effect is Bacillus 
thuringiensis (Bt) plants, an early commercial product of rDNA technology 
that introduced genes from soil bacterium into host crops like corn in order 
to give them insecticidal properties.134 There is no definitive research 
proving that the consumption of such plants is safe or unsafe.135 Though 
studies thus far have not demonstrated any short-term risks,136 the products 
have not been on the market long enough to make an analysis of their long-
 
 125. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4710. 
 126. Gilhooly, supra note 116, at 1097–98. 
 127. Gao, supra note 1, at 304. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id (noting that all field testing was stopped and all plant material destroyed). 
 130. See id (noting that the product never moved beyond field testing).  
 131. See supra, Part I.B.2.  
 132. Gao, supra note 1, at 299–300. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 301. More specifically, the transferred gene causes the host plant to express 
particular endotoxins that repel common insects. Id. 
 135. Rich, supra note 13, at 894–95. 
 136. Id. 
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term effects feasible.137 The widespread use of Bt crops has caused some in 
the scientific community to hypothesize about the potential dangers 
associated with higher exposure levels, particularly for immuno-
compromised individuals.138 Genetic engineering may also produce an 
indirect effect on levels of plant toxins because ―the introduction of new 
genes may increase or decrease the expression of the existing proteins or 
enzymes, which in turn results in the change of other substances in 
plants.‖139 Finally, the process itself can have the indirect effect of 
increasing (or decreasing) the amount of toxins produced by a plant, if, for 
instance, a transgene is inserted into a host gene that plays a role in 
regulating toxin levels.140 Because the most common scientific methods 
used for genetic modification involve random insertion, there is a distinct 
possibility of this occurrence.141  
In 1990, a genetically engineered version of the supplement tryptophan 
was taken off the market after scientists discovered that it was responsible 
for producing deadly contaminants.142 The mistake cost at least thirty-six 
Americans their lives, and caused 1500 people to develop a permanently 
disabling blood disorder known as eosinophilia-myalgia syndrome 
(EMS).143 The New York Times reported that the Japanese chemical 
company responsible for marketing the supplement has paid billions in 
damages to victims of the incident.144 Although the genetic modification 
 
 137. Id. at 895. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Gao, supra note 1, at 299–300. See also Jacobson, supra note 19, at 220 (―Levels of 
naturally occurring toxins, such as solanine, might accidentally be increased in genetically 
modified plants.‖). 
 140. Gao, supra note 1, at 300. See also JEFFREY M. SMITH, GENETIC ROULETTE: THE 
DOCUMENTED HEALTH RISKS OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS 84–6 (2007) (discussing the 
alteration in levels of plant metabolites that results from gene insertion and providing examples of 
studies demonstrating increased toxin production by genetically engineered tobacco, yeast, 
potatoes, and wheat).  
 141. Gao, supra note 1, at 300; Robertson, supra note 77, at 168 (―Techniques, such as directly 
inserting genes using a ‗gene gun‘ or transferring DNA through bacteria, do not provide great 
control over where the genetic material is inserted.‖). For further discussion of the disruptive 
effect of randomly inserting transgenes into host plant DNA, see Smith, supra note 140, at 64–5.  
 142. Denise Grady, Dietary Supplement Found to Be Contaminated, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 1, 1998, 
at F8. See also THE CAMPAIGN TO LABEL GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, GENETICALLY 
ENGINEERED FOODS AND YOUR HEALTH (2003) (on file with author) (describing the dietary 
supplement as ―mutated tryptophan‖ and asserting that it ―wreaked havoc‖ in the form of death 
and disability before the FDA recalled it). 
 143. See, e.g., Genetically-Modified Foods: The Silent Killer, GM Tryptophan-EMS-Killed 37 
and Permanently Disabled 1500 People, 
http://todayyesterdayandtomorrow.wordpress.com/2007/06/09/gm-tryptophan-ems-killed-37-and-
permanently-disabled-1500-people/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2011). The disorder is known as EMS 
because it causes elevated counts of eosinophils, a type of white blood cell. Grady, supra note 
142. 
 144. Grady, supra note 142. 
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process was never definitively proven to be the source of the toxin 
production, substantial evidence indicates that it likely was.145 Most 
notably, some experts have blamed the lack of a labeling requirement— 
which made it impossible to discern whether consumers had ingested a 
conventional or GE version of the supplement— for the months-long delay 
in discovering the source of the toxins.146 Had there been a labeling 
requirement, the FDA would arguably have been able to isolate the source 
of the contaminant more quickly and save lives or prevent disability as a 
result.  
3. Antibiotic Resistance 
The third known health risk that may be associated with genetic 
engineering is antibiotic resistance.147 It is common practice to use 
antibiotic-resistant marker genes as part of the procedure so scientists can 
determine whether they have successfully inserted the target gene.148 As 
one author has summarized, ―Some scientists fear that the quality [of 
antibiotic resistance] could be transferred either to humans who consume 
the plant, or to naturally occurring pathogenic bacteria, thus reducing the 
therapeutic effects of antibiotics taken for medical reasons.‖149 The serious 
consequences of antibiotic resistance have been well documented in recent 
years, due to the media spotlight on so-called superbugs, such as 
Extensively-Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis (XDR TB) and Methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA).150 Whether or not genetic 
 
 145. See JEFFREY M. SMITH, SEEDS OF DECEPTION 107–25 (2003) (describing the available 
evidence, scientific and media coverage surrounding the incident, and the FDA‘s resistance to 
experts‘ efforts to link the genetic engineering process with the fatal toxins).  
 146. John B. Fagan, Physicians & Scientists for Responsible Application of Science & 
Technology, Tryptophan Summary (Nov. 1997), http://www.psrast.org/jftrypt.htm. 
 147. Rich, supra note 13, at 895. Antibiotic resistance has become a serious public health 
threat in recent decades. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, FAST FACTS: FACTS 
ABOUT ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE, http://www.cdc.gov/getsmart/antibiotic-use/fast-facts.html (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2011). It is thought to result from the misuse and overuse of antibiotics to combat 
common bacterial infections in human and veterinary medicine. Id. As a result of this growing 
phenomenon, bacterial illnesses are posing more serious health consequences as the underlying 
bacteria that cause them become resistant to the frontline antibiotics previously used for treatment. 
Id.  
 148. Rich, supra note 13, at 895. 
 149. Id. See also THE CAMPAIGN TO LABEL GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, supra note 
142 (describing the use of antibiotics as markers in genetic engineering and the risk that these 
markers may increase antibiotic resistance).  
 150. TASK GROUP ON PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, EUROPEAN FEDERATION OF 
BIOTECHNOLOGY, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE MARKERS IN GENETICALLY MODIFIED (GM) CROPS 
2 (2001), available at http://www.efb-central.org/images/uploads/AntibioticRM_English.pdf 
(―Today resistance to antibiotics is so widespread that some of the first generation of antibiotics 
are of no use anymore. Multiple antibiotic resistance in pathogenic strains of Staphylococcus and 
JESADA - Vol 13 Website Final 4/28/2011 7:12 PM 
S-46 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 14:Supp. 
engineering practices contribute substantially to antibiotic resistance is not 
entirely resolved and merits focused scientific study.151 In the meantime, 
the possibility is sufficient to support a labeling requirement, so consumers 
who wish to avoid GM products due to this uncertainty are afforded the 
opportunity to do so.  
4. Unknown Long-Term Health Risks 
Uncertainty is the bottom line for many consumers. There is no 
determinative research on the long-term effects of eating genetically 
engineered foods.152 They have not been on the market long enough for 
scientists to conduct longitudinal studies or even studies that take into 
account one human lifespan.153 Additionally, because labeling has not been 
required to date, future researchers face the potentially insurmountable task 
of creating control groups that have never been exposed to GM products— 
an element that is, at best, difficult to determine when consumers cannot 
distinguish between conventional and GM foods.154 As one author framed 
 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis, especially in hospitals, is of particular concern to the medical 
community.‖). 
 151. See id. at 4 (acknowledging that antibiotic resistant markers have not necessarily been 
proven safe and noting that alternative markers are under investigation but will require additional 
safety studies prior to commercialization). 
 152. Rich, supra note 13, at 901 (―To some extent, the question of how safe or dangerous 
genetically modified crops are is still unanswerable, due to a lack of studies on the long-term 
effects of GMOs on both human health and the environment.‖); id. at 900 (―At the very least, the 
cumulative force of the research is indeterminate of the risk posed by GMOs to human health.‖). 
 153. See id. at 900 (indicating that there is existing research concluding GMOs are safe for 
human health, but only in the ―short term,‖ and characterizing research suggestive of health risks 
as ―speculative‖). GM plants first became available on the commercial market in 1996. Gao, supra 
note 1, at 298. Therefore an individual who has been consuming GMOs since 1996 has been 
exposed to them for only fifteen years, whereas the average life expectancy in the U.S. is about 
78. Melonie Heron et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2006, 57 NAT‘L VITAL STAT. REP. 1 (2009), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57_14.pdf. Furthermore, there has 
been an observed tendency for the biotechnology industry to produce studies concluding that GM 
products are safe, ―while most of the risk-finding studies are conducted by private researchers.‖ 
Rich, supra note 13, at 900. 
 154. There is no surefire way to ensure that a study participant has entirely avoided foods 
containing GM ingredients, but participants who claim to exclusively consume certified organic 
foods would be a starting point, since foods that are certified and labeled as organic cannot contain 
GM ingredients. See Zeichner, supra note 48, at 488 (―The USDA organic label was created in 
accordance with organic principles that promote awareness of the impacts that production of food 
has on the environment, the animal world and society as a whole. After much consideration, the 
USDA decided that genetic engineering was not consistent with these ideals and concluded that 
the organic label should not be used on foods that have gone through GE processes.‖). On the 
other hand, this exclusion applies only to the process of genetic engineering. Therefore under 
USDA policy, ―the unintended presence of [GM] products does not affect the status of an organic 
product or operations.‖ Rich, supra note 13, at 911 (citing National Organic Program, 7 C.F.R. § 
205 (2003)). In other words, a food that is certified organic may unintentionally contain GMOs 
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the issue: ―The introduction of GMO products into the United States food 
supply serves as an experiment, albeit performed on unwilling subjects and 
without following scientific method.‖155 An FDA report in 2000 revealed 
that consumers are concerned about ―the potential for unknown long-term 
effects of the technology, in particular health effects.‖156 This attitude, also 
known as the hazard model, is informed by comparisons to other 
agricultural technologies (e.g., growth hormones) and the belief that the 
government does not adequately consider consumer interests.157 
One example of an unknown but potentially long-term health risk is 
the possibility that genetic modification could somehow alter the level of 
existing nutrients in the host plant or their ability to be absorbed by the 
human body.158 This prospect, like producing new allergens or toxins, 
arises as a result of the random insertion of the transgene.159 Though an 
alteration in the level of most nutrients would not typically have fatal 
consequences, it could nonetheless be seriously injurious to health in 
situations where certain populations rely on a particular GM food as their 
main source of a specific nutrient.160 Assume, for example, that a particular 
neighborhood with a large Latino population is a major consumer of corn 
and depends on this dietary staple as its primary source of Vitamin B1 
(thiamin). Because there is no labeling requirement, this group has no way 
of determining whether it is consuming conventional or GM corn. If the 
GM corn contains lowered values of vitamin B1, and this population is 
consuming mostly GM corn, then negative health consequences may ensue. 
Memory loss and Alzheimer‘s disease are associated with a lack of 
acetylcholine,161 and the synthesis of this neurotransmitter requires 
sufficient amounts of Vitamin B1.162 What‘s more, the affected individuals 
would not be aware of the source of the problem and, therefore, would not 
be empowered to make adjustments in their purchasing and eating habits to 
account for this potential impact.  
 
due to pollen drift. Id. This situation aggravates the difficulty of identifying a group of individuals 
for research purposes who have never consumed GMOs. 
 155. Rich, supra note 13, at 901.  
 156. Zeichner, supra note 48, at 485 (citing ALAN S. LEVY & BRENDA M. DERBY, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., REPORT ON CONSUMER FOCUS GROUPS ON BIOTECHNOLOGY (2000)).  
 157. Id at 486 (citing ALAN S. LEVY & BRENDA M. DERBY, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
REPORT ON CONSUMER FOCUS GROUPS ON BIOTECHNOLOGY (2000)). 
 158. Rich, supra note 13, at 895. 
 159. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. For further discussion, see Gao, supra note 1, 
at 306 (describing the four ways in which an alteration of nutrient levels could potentially occur). 
 160. Gao, supra note 1, at 306. 
 161. The World‘s Healthiest Foods, Corn, 
http://www.whfoods.com/genpage.php?tname=foodspice&dbid=90 (last visited Apr. 19, 2011). 
 162. Id. 
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Opponents of GMO labeling point out that the same problem can 
occur using conventional breeding techniques and that the issue is 
addressed by the nutritional analysis GM foods undergo.163 This FDA 
consultation is entirely voluntary, however,164 so there is no way of 
ensuring that a significant change in the nutritional profile of a GM plant 
would be identified. The fact that genetic engineering can now be used to 
improve the nutritional profile of certain foods165 increases the odds that a 
particular population will rely solely on a GM food for a particular 
nutrient.166 For instance, a variety of rice with enhanced levels of Vitamin 
A (also known as Golden Rice) is currently under development,167 with the 
goal of distributing it to developing countries where large numbers of 
people suffer from the debilitating effects of Vitamin A deficiency, such as 
blindness.168 Only if the developer of Golden Rice chooses to undergo 
voluntary consultation with the FDA will an independent compositional 
analysis be performed to evaluate the nutrients contained in the new 
product. Otherwise, it is entirely possible that a critical nutrient in the rice, 
other than Vitamin A, could potentially be lowered as a result of the genetic 
modification process; thus, a population that mainly eats rice would suffer 
any health consequences associated with a reduction of that nutrient. 
B. Policy Arguments Support a Mandatory Labeling Requirement for 
GMOs 
 As an initial premise, expecting the developers of GM foods to self-
police when they stand to benefit significantly from the commercial 
availability of these products creates a conflict of interest.169 Not only is 
future profit at stake, but the biotechnology industry has also invested 
billions of dollars in research and development,170 and therefore, has an 
obvious interest in promoting the widespread use of GMOs whether or not 
 
 163. Gao, supra note 1, at 306 (―The potential alteration in nutrient composition of new GM 
varieties is addressed through characterization of the inserted gene and compositional analysis of 
the GM foods.‖). 
 164. See supra, Part I.B.2.  
 165. Gao, supra note 1, at 306. 
 166. See id. (noting that the greatest incidence of Vitamin A deficiency is found in South and 
Southeast Asia because rice is the primary food in these regions, and it does not produce Vitamin 
A). 
 167. Id. at 306–07. 
 168. Gregory Jaffe, The Next Generation, 26 ENV. FORUM 38, 40 (2009); Baris Karapinar & 
Michelangelo Temmerman, Benefiting from Biotechnology: Pro-Poor Intellectual Property Rights 
and Public-Private Partnerships, 27 BIOTECH. L. REP. 189, 191 (2008). 
 169. THE CAMPAIGN TO LABEL GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, supra note 142.  
 170. Rich, supra note 13, at 909 (―The biotech food industry has not only spent billions of 
dollars on research and development, but has also spent millions in fighting labeling initiatives.‖).  
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they are safe.171 A labeling requirement would level this uneven playing 
field by putting the burden of proving the safety of GMOs on those in a 
position to gain from them.172 Such a requirement would ―encourage 
biotech companies to ‗sell‘ the consumers on their products, rather than 
slipping the products into the market without notice to consumers.‖173 
Otherwise, American consumers bear the potential risks and costs 
associated with this technology.174  
 In a similar vein, a labeling requirement would increase consumer 
awareness of the issue and promote public debate.175 It would also highlight 
the need for and encourage additional research on the safety of GM 
foods.176 Considering the deadly tryptophan incident in 1990, for example, 
begs the question whether a labeling requirement would have inspired the 
manufacturer to conduct more extensive testing of its product prior to 
marketing. Labeling would enable consumers to correlate GM products 
with their corporate manufacturers;177 thus, it would encourage FDA 
consultation and additional research because the reputation of a company‘s 
name brand would be on the line. 
The American public overwhelmingly supports mandated labeling.178 
In 2000, the FDA convened consumer focus groups on the topic of GMO 
labeling in four states selected to reflect cultural and geographic 
diversity.179 The study found that almost all participants favored a labeling 
requirement,180 and, additionally, that they expressed shock and ―outrage‖ 
upon learning that GMOs were already available to the public.181 An ABC 
poll the following year concluded that ninety-three percent of respondents 
believed there should be a federal labeling requirement for all GE foods.182 
Also in 2001, the Center for Science in the Public Interest found that about 
 
 171. Id. (―It would seem that [the biotech industry has] bet the proverbial bank on the success 
of their products, and thus [has] more than just a glancing interest in the widespread public 
acceptance of genetically modified foods.‖).  
 172. THE CAMPAIGN TO LABEL GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, supra note 142. 
 173. Rich, supra note 13, at 915. 
 174. Id. at 909. 
 175. THE CAMPAIGN TO LABEL GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, supra note 142. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See infra, notes 180–87 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Megan Carter Judge, Consumers and Benefits of Genetically Modified Vegetables 30 
(Mar. 2010) (unpublished M.S. dissertation, California Polytechnic State University) (on file with 
author) (reporting the details of the FDA focus group study, which is no longer available from 
FDA). 
 180. See id. at 32 (―Participants were in agreement on the value of a ‗mere disclosure‘ 
labeling.‖). 
 181. Id. at 33. 
 182. Gary Langer, Behind the Label: Many Skeptical of Bio-Engineered Food, 
ABCNEWS.COM (2001), http://abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/DailyNews/poll010619.html. 
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two-thirds of its survey participants wanted GMO labeling.183 Additional 
studies by the Pew Initiative and Novartis, a major producer of GM foods, 
reported that seventy-five percent and ninety-three percent of respondents, 
respectively, supported a labeling requirement.184 Consumer support for 
stricter regulations is not just a thing of the past; more recently, there was a 
strong backlash against President Bush‘s proposals to loosen regulation of 
GM crops.185 In March 2009, a group of eighty-two public interest, 
environmental advocacy, and farming organizations186 sent a letter to the 
Secretary of the USDA demanding that the agency provide stricter 
oversight with more public input and freeze approvals of GM crops pending 
such changes.187 While the attitude of the public may not be based on 
scientific knowledge, its buying power keeps the biotechnology industry in 
business; to overlook public outcry is overly paternalistic from a policy 
standpoint and undermines the principles of democratic government, 
particularly in light of the industry‘s unmatched lobbying power.188 
 Not only does the public want to know what it is eating,189 but there 
is also a substantial movement arguing that the public has a right to 
know.190 Consumers may wish to avoid GMOs for many reasons, whether 
due to concern over potential health risks, dietary limitations, or religious or 
 
 183. Gregory A. Jaffe, Center for Science in the Public Interest, Labeling Genetically Modified 
Foods: Communicating or Creating Confusion? (Jun. 27, 2002), 
http:www.cspinet.org/biotech/pew-forum.html. 
 184. Zeichner, supra note 48, at 485 (citing Compilation and Analysis of Public Opinion Polls 
on Genetically Engineered Foods, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, 
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/facts&issues/polls.html (Feb. 1, 2000)).  
 185. See Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, Diverse Farmer and Public Interest Groups Urge 
USDA to Freeze Approvals of Genetically Engineered Crops (Mar. 20, 2009), 
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/2009/03/20/diverse-farmer-and-public-interest-groups-urge-
usda-to-freeze-approvals-of-genetically-engineered-crops.  
 186. Signatories to the letter included groups as diverse as the California Farm Stewardship 
Association, Farm Aid, Health Care Without Harm, the National Cooperative Grocers 
Association, the Rodale Institute, the Sierra Club, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and small 
seed companies and family farms, among others. Letter from Eighty-Two Public Interest Groups 
to Tom Vilsack, Secretary, U.S. Dep‘t of Agric. (Mar. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/pubs/Final_APHIS-2008-
2003%20Supplemental%20Comments.pdf. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Rich, supra note 13, at 906 (―To ignore mass public concern is irresponsible, and denotes 
a paternalistic approach to public policy. . . . The public‘s ‗right to know‘ might better be thought 
of as a ‗right to be heard.‘ And listened to. This is the essence of a representative government, a 
fact not lost to the biotech industry, which has taken full advantage of their lobbying power to 
ensure technology-friendly regulations.‖). 
 189. See supra, notes 180–87 and accompanying text. 
 190. See Rich, supra note 13, at 904–09 (describing the consumer right-to-know argument 
within the context of consumer choice and the biotech industry‘s desire to avoid a labeling 
requirement). 
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moral restrictions.191 Vegetarians, for instance, ―may find unacceptable the 
presence of a non-vegetable constituent even in the form of a gene, which 
only expresses agronomic characteristics useful for growth.‖192 Because 
GMOs are found in a vast majority of grocery store products,193 it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, for such consumers to avoid them altogether.194 
Without labeling, their only choice is to grow their own food or purchase 
only certified organic food, options that would not be feasible for many 
Americans based on the land and other resources required for the former 
and the higher cost and limited availability of the latter.195 From a policy 
perspective, these options are so unrealistic that people are essentially not 
afforded a choice at all.  
 What‘s more, individuals cannot identify food products containing 
GM ingredients and are therefore excluded not only from taking personal 
responsibility for their health in this regard, but also from expressing a 
preference that should be reflected in the marketplace.196 As many experts 
have pointed out, the industry‘s argument is contrary to the very concept of 
consumer choice: ―Without labeling, no choice can be made, and thus no 
preference can be conveyed to the manufacturers. The fear of the biotech 
industry may not be that irrational choices will be made by consumers, but 
that consumers will legitimately reject their products.‖197 Some ardent 
proponents of this approach go so far as to argue that the lack of a labeling 
requirement constitutes consumer deception in cases where a GM food is so 
different from its conventional counterpart that it cannot be understood to 
be the same product.198  
C. The Solution Should Come Under Federal Rather than State Law to 
Achieve Uniformity and Circumvent Legal Challenges that Would Most 
Likely Make State Legislative Responses Ineffective 
A mandatory labeling scheme should be implemented under federal 
law in order to avoid the constitutional problems that have plagued state 
efforts to enact such laws thus far. State responses to biotechnology issues 
 
 191. Robertson, supra note 77, at 170; Gilhooley, supra note 116, at 1112.  
 192. Gilhooley, supra note 116, at 1112. 
 193. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 194. Rich, supra note 13, at 907. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 908. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Gilhooley, supra note 116, at 1103–04 (―The important question is whether the consumer 
would understand a food to be different, and not what they thought it to be, if the food 
incorporated a gene from a different plant without a disclosure.‖). 
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have varied widely: a 2007 article reported that nine states199 at that time 
had labeling laws (mandatory or voluntary), while twenty-two200 gave tax 
breaks or other funding to attract biotech producers.201 At the other end of 
the spectrum, dozens of bills have been introduced at the state level 
proposing to ban particular biotech products or requiring a permit to import 
or commercially release them within the state.202 Where states have passed 
mandatory GMO labeling requirements, the courts have not upheld them.203 
A frequently cited example, which presents similar concerns though it is not 
precisely parallel, is Vermont‘s mandatory labeling of milk products 
containing the growth hormone rBST.204 In 1995, the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit granted an injunction to the dairy industry against 
enforcement of the statute.205 The dairy producers successfully argued that 
it violated the First Amendment.206 
Preemption by federal food labeling laws may also pose an 
insurmountable challenge. It is important to distinguish labeling from food 
safety, which the Supreme Court considers to be a local issue.207 States are 
free (to some extent) to impose more rigorous restrictions on food safety 
than the FDCA does,208 and courts typically set the threshold at explicit 
 
 199. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 459 (citing National Conference of State 
Legislatures, Biotechnology Statutes Chart, Jul. 7, 2007, 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/agri/biotchlg.htm). The nine states with labeling laws are: Alaska, 
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia and Wisconsin. Id.  
 200. The states with financial breaks for biotechnology producers include: Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 459 (citing National 
Conference of State Legislatures, Biotechnology Statutes Chart, 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/agri/biotchlg.htm).  
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. (citing National Conference of State Legislatures, Biotechnology Statutes Chart, 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/agri/biotchlg.htm) (―California is the only state to have an outright 
ban on a biotechnology product, but twenty-nine bills have been introduced seeking to ban some 
aspect of biotechnology, and nine states require a permit either for the importation or release of 
genetically-modified products.‖). 
 203. See Robertson, supra note 77, at 163–65 (describing successful constitutional challenges 
to state statutes mandating labeling of GMOs, based on Commerce Clause and First Amendment 
claims).  
 204. Id. at 163–64. 
 205. Int‘l Dairy Foods Ass‘n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1996).  
 206. Id. at 72–73. The dairy manufacturers also made an argument based on Commerce Clause 
grounds, but the Court did not reach this claim because it found that they were entitled to an 
injunction based on the First Amendment claim. Id. at 70. 
 207. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 468. 
 208. Id. at 469 (―The definition of adulterated food in the FDCA is considered a floor for food 
safety regulations, not a ceiling. Therefore, under the FDCA, states may place additional 
restrictions on food production produced using biotechnology. . . . Short of a ban, states may 
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preemption or conflict preemption as a requirement for blocking state action 
in this area.209 For food labeling, however, there is clear evidence of 
Congressional intent to preempt state regulation.210 The Nutrition Labeling 
and Education Act (NLEA)211 is the impetus behind the common nutrition 
facts panel found on grocery store shelves around the country.212 This 
information is required under the first section of the NLEA.213 The second 
section of the statute involves voluntary claims that expressly or implicitly 
relate to any of the nutrients on the requisite nutrition facts (e.g., ―high in 
fiber‖).214  
The NLEA addresses preemption explicitly.215 First, states may not 
impose food labeling requirements that are not identical to those under the 
first section of the NLEA.216 An exception to this provision leaves states 
free to regulate nutrient labels for food sold in restaurants rather than retail 
locations like grocery stores.217 Second, states are prohibited from 
regulating the voluntary health claims falling under the second section of 
the statute, even when they are made on food sold by restaurants.218 The 
FDA posits that information on biotechnology procedures used to create a 
food product does not constitute nutritional information that meets 
disclosure requirements; therefore, ―it is unlikely it will find that the general 
public of a state has a particular need for the information; and thus, it is 
unlikely that the FDA will grant an exemption for mandatory labeling.‖219 
Even if an exemption were granted, Constitutional objections—namely the 
 
regulate food safety so long as those regulations do not contradict federal regulations, and food 
producers can comply with both sets of rules.‖). 
 209. Id. at 468 (―Because food safety is generally a local concern, courts require either explicit 
preemption or conflict preemption in order to preempt a state or local regulation.‖) (citing Fla. 
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963)). 
 210. Id. 
 211. 21 U.S.C. §§ 343(q)-(r) (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
 212. Id. § 343(q)(1). 
 213. Id.  
 214. Id. § 343(r)(1)(A); id. § 343(r)(1)(B).  
 215. Id. § 343-1(a)(4); id. § 343-1(a)(5).  
 216. Id. 343-1(a)(4). 
 217. N.Y. State Rest. Ass‘n v. N.Y. City Bd. Of Health, 509 F. Supp 2d 351, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007). 
 218. Id. at 358. 
 219. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 469–70 (citing CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED 
NUTRITION, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: VOLUNTARY LABELING 
INDICATING WHETHER FOODS HAVE OR HAVE NOT BEEN DEVELOPED USING BIOENGINEERING 
(draft) (2001), 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/Food
LabelingNutrition/ucm059098.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2011). 
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commercial free speech rights of GMO producers under the First 
Amendment—are likely to impede state litigation.220 
Even without the constitutional obstacles facing state legislatures in 
this arena, state legislation would not be the appropriate forum for imposing 
a labeling regime.221 States lack the resources to conduct adequate research 
on the human health impacts of GM products, and as a consequence, state 
officials feel this responsibility should fall on the shoulders of the federal 
government.222 A 2004 survey by the Pew Foundation suggested that states 
operate under conflicting influences when it comes to biotechnology: if 
their regulations are too strict, they could drive biotech dollars to other 
states, but if they are not strict enough, the health and safety of their 
residents could be at risk.223 The Pew survey also revealed that state 
officials are primarily concerned with the local impacts of biotechnology, 
such as economic issues facing local farmers.224 Considering these 
challenges to state labeling legislation in the aggregate, as one author has 
concluded, ―If Congress wishes to treat biotechnology differently from 
conventional crops, and either grant states greater or lesser power to 
regulate the field, it must act and specify that desire. Until then, courts will 
likely view the inaction as satisfaction with the currently [sic] regulatory 
scheme, including that scheme‘s preemption.‖225 
D. Voluntary Labeling Is Not a Viable Alternative and Would Most 
Likely Violate FDA Policy 
One option for food producers is voluntary labeling to express the 
absence of GMOs (e.g., ―GMO free‖) or indicate that biotechnology has not 
 
 220. For further discussion, see id. at 470. For additional discussion of preemption by the 
NLEA, see Robertson, supra note 77, at 165–68. 
 221. See infra notes 222–25 and accompanying text. 
 222. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 458 (citing MICHAEL R. TAYLOR ET AL., 
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, TENDING THE FIELDS: STATE & FEDERAL ROLES IN THE 
OVERSIGHT OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 22 (2004), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_Biotechnology/Te
nding_Fields_Biotech1204.pdf). 
 223. Id. (citing MICHAEL R. TAYLOR ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, TENDING THE 
FIELDS: STATE & FEDERAL ROLES IN THE OVERSIGHT OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 26 
(2004), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_Biotechnology/Te
nding_Fields_Biotech1204.pdf).  
 224. Id. (citing MICHAEL R. TAYLOR ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, TENDING THE 
FIELDS: STATE & FEDERAL ROLES IN THE OVERSIGHT OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 22 
(2004), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_Biotechnology/Te
nding_Fields_Biotech1204.pdf). 
 225. Id. at 474. 
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been used in the development of a particular food product.226 There are two 
reasons that voluntary labeling is problematic and does not offer a sufficient 
solution for notifying consumers about GM ingredients. First, there is a 
likelihood that many voluntary labels violate FDA regulations,227 although 
the FDA has not expressly prohibited them.228 The agency issued a policy 
statement in 2001 indicating that claims like ―GMO free‖ may be 
misleading, and therefore barred under the FDCA,229 because a threshold 
level of GM components in food items has not been established, and such a 
label may imply that foods containing GMOs are inferior.230 Additional 
guidance from the FDA provided examples of acceptable claims that would 
―avoid or minimize‖ an implication of inferiority, such as ―we do not use 
ingredients that were produced using biotechnology.‖231 On the other hand, 
it described in detail the many ways in which a claim could be 
misleading.232 For instance, even when it is true that a particular ingredient 
was not genetically modified, such a statement would be misleading ―if 
consumers believe that the entire product or a larger portion of it than is 
actually the case is free of bioengineered material.‖233 Another example of 
a potentially misleading statement is a claim that an item or ingredient is 
not genetically modified, when there has never been a GM version of that 
item or ingredient available on the market.234 This guidance is likely to be 
confusing to food manufacturers and therefore overly burdensome to 
interpret and implement,235 especially considering the potential costs and 
legal exposure that result from violating the FDCA.236  
 
 226. Id. at 452. 
 227. Robertson, supra note 77, at 161. 
 228. Id. (―Even voluntary disclosure of the presence or absence of GMOs on labels may violate 
FDA regulations.‖); see also Chen, supra note 18, at 1583 (describing in detail the conflict 
between voluntary labeling and the FDCA). 
 229. Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been Developed Using 
Bioengineering, 66 Fed. Reg. 4839, 4840 (Jan. 18, 2001). 
 230. Id. 
 231. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: VOLUNTARY LABELING INDICATING WHETHER FOODS HAVE OR HAVE NOT 
BEEN DEVELOPED USING BIOENGINEERING (draft) (2001), 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/Food
LabelingNutrition/ucm059098.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2011). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Robertson, supra note 77, at 161 (―The FDA has given confusing signals regarding 
whether producers can voluntarily and legally use labels specifically noting that they do not use 
GMO ingredients.‖); id. at 163 (―Until this issue is litigated, non-GMO food producers will 
increase their exposure to law suits by continuing to market products with labels referring to 
health or environmental issues and the absence of GMO ingredients.‖).  
 236. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2006) (describing the criminal penalties for violating the FDCA); 
id. § 335b(a) (describing civil penalties for violating the FDCA). 
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The second obvious problem is that this type of labeling is purely 
voluntary,237 so it remains difficult or impossible to distinguish most GM 
products from their unlabeled, non-GM counterparts. In light of the strong 
possibility that many voluntary labels (even those considered appropriate by 
the FDA) will be misleading or confusing to the public, they may even 
undermine the goal of empowering consumers with accurate 
information.238 Such a system leaves consumers vulnerable to exaggerated 
labeling claims that play into popular suspicions of biotechnology.239 From 
another perspective, a voluntary labeling scheme may also be unfair in that 
it places the costs associated with labeling on the producers of non-GMO 
foods, whereas the producers of GMOs are the ones introducing a new 
technology that deviates from the established status quo.240 Some states 
have successfully steered clear of this issue by integrating biotechnology 
considerations into their organic labeling regulations, such as requiring that 
certified organic foods be produced with little or no genetic 
modification.241 
CONCLUSION 
At the heart of the controversy surrounding GMOs is this question: is 
it appropriate for the government to presume GM foods are safe and allow 
the biotechnology industry to market them until proven otherwise, or should 
the onus of demonstrating their safety be on the companies who stand to 
profit from them?242 Though no studies definitively prove that GMOs are 
harmful, no studies prove that they are safe either.243 Considering the 
possibility of serious health and safety risks,244 we should err on the side of 
adopting an overly cautious approach to regulation. As history has 
demonstrated, if any of the potential risks actualize, the result could be 
 
 237. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 238. Jaffe, supra note 183 (―Much of the information provided in a voluntary system will take 
advantage of consumers‘ concerns and lack of knowledge about biotechnology, instead of 
providing accurate and non-disparaging information.‖).  
 239. Id; see also Chen, supra note 18, at 1585–86 (―Fear about food is one of the most deeply 
seated forms of behavioral protection against the natural world. . . . It is precisely here, where food 
comes into contact with notions of good and evil, that the classic regulatory state must take its 
stand.‖). 
 240. Rich, supra note 13, at 909 (―While it may be in the industry‘s best interest to not label, 
the alternative is that those who do not want to eat genetically modified foods will bear the cost. 
Whether or not such an expectation is fair to the concerned consumer remains in doubt.‖). 
 241. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 471. 
 242. See supra, Part B. 
 243. Rich, supra note 13, at 906 (―The studies done on genetically modified crops are at the 
very least inconclusive in terms of impact upon human health and the environment. Enough doubt 
remains to substantiate legitimate concern.‖). 
 244. See supra, Part II.A. 
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irrevocable damage.245 American consumers should not have to shoulder 
this burden. In the absence of mandatory FDA review, a federal labeling 
requirement would provide an appropriate middle ground by enabling 
consumers to make their own choices based on the information available.246 
 
 
 245. Robertson, supra note 77, at 170. 
 246. See supra, Part II.B.  
